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Abstract
We show that for international economies with two countries in which agents
have additively separable utility functions the existence of sunspot equilib-
ria is equivalent to the occurrence of the transfer paradox. This equivalence
enables us to provide some new insights on the relation of the existence of
sunspot equilibria and the multiplicity of spot market equilibria. We also
show that the equivalence does not need to hold for models with more than
two countries.
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1 Introduction
A well known paradox in international trade theory is the so-called transfer
paradox (cf. Leontief (1936)). This paradox is said to occur if some country
donates some of its resources to some other country and yet the donor benefits
while the recipient is worse off. The transfer paradox is important for example
to understand the widening gap between the gross national product of less
and of highly developed countries. According to this view foreign aid may
be the reason for the disadvantageous development of the recipient country.
A well known paradox in financial economics is the so-called sunspot para-
dox. This paradox is said to occur if some exogenous event has no direct
influence on the economic fundamentals and yet the endogenous equilibrium
allocation depends on it. Sunspot equilibria are important for example to un-
derstand the phenomenon of self-fulfilling expectations which is an essential
feature of financial markets.
At first sight these two paradoxes seem unrelated. The transfer paradox
concerns comparative statics with respect to endowment redistributions while
the sunspot paradox is a property of competitive equilibria in some given
economy. The idea that these paradoxes may be related arises from the
observation that both can result from the multiplicity of equilibria. However,
multiplicity of equilibria is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the
paradoxes to occur and it would be useful to establish actual equivalence as
this would allow the two strands of literature to be combined. The purpose
of this note is to show that for a large class of economies these two paradoxes
are indeed equivalent. Hence, this note provides a link between two strands
of the literature which have so far been developed in isolation.
We show that for the case of two agents, with utility functions being
concave transformations of additively separable functions, the existence of
sunspot equilibria is equivalent to the occurrence of the transfer paradox.
As an application of this equivalence we demonstrate that the occurrence of
sunspot equilibria is indeed subject to the same critique as the occurrence
of the transfer paradox. In a model with two commodities, sunspot equilib-
ria can only occur if the initial equilibrium (the equilibrium without asset
trade) is not unique. Moreover, if as in the case of Cobb-Douglas economies,
uniqueness of equilibria is guaranteed for (almost) all distributions of endow-
ments then sunspot equilibria cannot occur at all. Then we show, again using
the equivalence between the two paradoxes, that nevertheless the occurrence
of sunspot equilibria does not need to be based on the exogenous selection
among multiple equilibria. We construct a simple example in which the equi-
librium of any sunspot state is not an equilibrium of any other sunspot state.
This example is based on the idea that financial markets may specify incom-
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plete insurance against the uncertainty that they induce. That is to say, in
this example asset payoffs are sunspot-dependent and incomplete.
Constructing explicit numerical examples in general equilibrium models is
usually done for a class of economies with a simple enough structure so that
excess demand functions remain manageable. Computable general equilib-
rium models (cf. Shoven and Whalley (1992)), examples for the occurrence
of the transfer paradox (Leontief (1936), Chichilinski (1980), Chichilinski
(1983), Rao (1992), Geanakoplos and Heal (1983), etc), and examples for
multiple equilibria (Kehoe (1985), Kehoe (1991), Hens, Schmedders and Voß
(1999), Hens, Laitenberger and Lo¨ﬄer (2002)) therefore use the class of
CES-utility functions. The class of utility functions assumed in this paper
(concave transformations of additively separable functions) includes CES-
functions. Keeping this assumption we broaden our analysis by looking into
the case of more than two agents (countries). We find that the occurrence of
the transfer paradox is then no longer sufficient for the existence of sunspot
equilibria.
To get the intuition for our results, note that a sunspot equilibrium con-
sists of a set of spot market equilibria (one for each sunspot state) where the
endowments of each spot market economy are obtained by redistributions re-
sulting from the equilibrium asset market allocation. Hence an unfavorable
redistribution of endowments as it occurs exogenously in the transfer para-
dox can be derived from asset trade only if the resulting income transfers can
be made compatible with the asset allocation the agents choose. In the asset
market equilibrium the sum across states (adjusted by the common proba-
bility beliefs) of the products of marginal utilities and wealth transfers has
to be equal to zero for all agents. Since marginal utilities are non-negative,
this requires first of all that all agents find some state with positive income
transfer and some with negative income transfer arising from asset trade.
Moreover, supposing that marginal utilities are inversely ordered than utility
levels, this requires that for some state in which an agent receives a negative
income transfer he has a higher utility than for some state with a non-negative
income transfer. This is achieved by the transfer paradox. In a sense the
transfer paradox then ”crosses the order” of marginal utility levels across
sunspot states. Note that otherwise all states with negative income transfers
would be weighted higher than those with positive income transfer and the
probability adjusted sum of marginal utilities times income transfers cannot
equalize zero. Hence, provided marginal utilities are inversely related to util-
ity levels the transfer paradox is necessary for sunspots to matter. Moreover,
by appropriate choice of the agents‘ risk aversions we can also show the con-
verse, i.e. that a slightly stronger version of the transfer paradox is indeed
sufficient for sunspots to matter. The role of additive separability in this
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reasoning is to guarantee that indeed higher marginal utilities are implied by
lower utility levels. This relation is neither true without additive separabil-
ity nor with separability and more than two agents. Therefore, with more
than two agents, the existence of sunspot equilibria is no longer tied to the
occurrence of the transfer paradox. Of course, a rigorous argument for this
intuition will be given once we have made precise the setup of the model
considered.
Finally, note that the relation of sunspot equilibria and uniqueness of
spot market equilibria has also been studied in economies in which a Pareto-
efficient allocation cannot be obtained without asset trade. These types of
economies originate in the famous ”leading example” of Cass (1989). With
first period consumption, asset trade may occur because of intertemporal
substitution and as a by-product this may introduce extrinsic uncertainty
as Cass (1989) has first pointed out. Gottardi and Kajii (1999) study an
intrinsically incomplete economy a la Cass (1989), however with real instead
of nominal assets. In our paper assets also have real payoffs but the result of
Gottardi and Kajii (1999), who show the existence of sunspot equilibria for a
strong uniqueness assumptions on the underlying economy does not apply to
our setting because it relies on first period consumption. Also for the same
reason the technique developed by Gottardi and Kajii (1999) is not applicable
here because they control the agents utility gradients both by perturbing the
utility functions and by changing the level of first-period consumption.
In the next section we outline the model. Then we give the definitions
of the transfer paradox and of sunspot equilibria. Thereafter we prove our
result establishing the equivalence of the transfer paradox and the occurrence
of sunspot equilibria. Section 4 applies this result to derive some new insights
both for sunspot equilibria and also for the transfer paradox. Section 5
concludes.
2 Model
We first outline the sunspot model. The transfer paradox will then be em-
bedded in the sunspot model by a new interpretation of the sunspot states.
There are two periods. In the second period, one of s = 1, . . . , S, states
of the world occurs. In the first period assets are traded. Consumption only
takes place in the second period. This assumption is important here because
otherwise the sunspot model cannot be linked to the atemporal transfer para-
dox model. There are i = 1, . . . , I, agents and l = 1, . . . , L, commodities in
each state. States are called sunspot states because the agents’ characteris-
tics within the states, i.e. the agents’ endowments ωi ∈ X i and their utility
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functions ui : X i → IR, do not depend on them. X i is a closed convex subset
of IRL+ which denotes agent i’s consumption set. In the sunspot literature the
agents’ characteristics [(ui,ωi)i=1,...,I.] are called the economic fundamentals.
Throughout this paper we make the
Assumption 1 (Additive Separability) All agents’ von Neumann-Mor-
genstern utility functions ui are additively separable, i.e. ui(xi1, . . . , x
i
L) =∑L
l=1 g
i
l(x
i
l) for all x
i ∈ X i, where the functions gil , l = 1, . . . , L, are assumed
to be twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and concave. More-
over, we assume that for every agent i at least L− 1 of the functions gil are
strictly concave and that for all commodities l there is some i for which gil is
strictly concave.
Note that the assumptions on the functions gil guarantee strict quasi-
concavity of the function ui. The class of utility functions covered by this as-
sumption is quite large and it includes all utility functions that are commonly
used in applied general equilibrium theory. In particular, the case of CES util-
ities defined for all i = 1, ..., I on X i = {x ∈ IRL++|ui(x) ≥ ui(ωi)}, for some
ωi ∈ IRL++, is covered by these assumptions, since then gil(xil) = (αil)1−ρi(xil)ρi
for some 0 < αil < 1, l = 1, . . . , L and some ρ
i < 1.
Moreover we assume that
Assumption 2 (Expected Utility) For all agents, i = 1, ..., I, the ex-
pected utility functions, defining preferences over state contingent consump-
tion xi(s) ∈ IRL, s = 1, ..., S are given by
U i(xi(1), . . . , xi(S)) =
S∑
s=1
pi(s)hi(ui(xi(s))) ∀xi ∈ (X i)S,
where the hi are twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and
strictly concave functions.
Hence what matters for agents’ asset demand is the composition hi ◦ ui,
which are concave transformations of additively separable functions. Note
that Assumptions 1 and 2 together are sufficient to guarantee strict quasi-
concavity of the function U i.
In the first period agents can trade j = 1, . . . , J , real assets with payoffs
Aj(s) ∈ IRL if state s occurs. We denote asset prices by q ∈ IRJ . Agent i’s
portfolio of assets is denoted by θi ∈ IRJ . Note that all asset payoffs are real,
i.e. in terms of commodities. Moreover, we allow for sunspot depended asset
payoffs. There is an impressive strand of the sunspot literature originating
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from Cass (1989) in which asset payoffs are nominal. In this literature as-
set payoffs measured in real terms differ across sunspot states if and only if
sunspots matter. The same is effectively also the case in our setting: Suppos-
ing spot market equilibria are unique the equilibrium transfers across states
measured in real terms depend on sunspots if and only if sunspots matter.
All equilibria we consider in this setting are special cases of competitive
equilibria, which are defined in
Def inition 1 (Competitive Equilibrium) A competitive equilibrium is an
allocation (
∗
x
i
,
∗
θ
i
),i=1,..,I, and a price system (
∗
p,
∗
q) such that
1. For all agents i = 1, .., I:
(
∗
x
i
,
∗
θ
i
) ∈ a rgmaxxi∈Xi,θi∈IRJ
∑S
s=1 pi(s)h
i(ui(xi(s)))
s.t.
∗
q · θi ≤ 0, ∗p(s) · xi(s) ≤ ∗p(s) · ωi + ∗p(s) · A(s)θi for all s = 1, . . . , S.
2.
∑I
i=1
∗
x
i
(s) =
∑I
i=1 ω
i for all s = 1, . . . , S.
3.
∑I
i=1
∗
θ
i
= 0.
Remark 1 To simplify the exposition when analyzing competitive equilib-
rium allocations we restrict attention to interior allocations, i.e. to alloca-
tions xi in the interior of IRL+, i=1,...,I. A sufficient assumption guaranteeing
the interiority of allocations is to impose that the functions hi and gil satisfy
the Inada condition according to which the marginal utility tends to infinity
at the boundary of the consumption set X i ⊂ IRL+.
Note that a competitive equilibrium consists of S spot market equilibria
(one for each spot market economy with endowments ωˆi(s) = ωi + A(s)θi)
together with an asset market equilibrium by which the ex-post endowments
of the spot markets are generated. It will be convenient to introduce the
spot-market economy of the economic fundamentals as a point of reference.
To abbreviate notations we therefore let this economy be the spot market
economy in the spot s = 0. Finally, note that when showing the existence
of sunspot equilibria we allow to choose the characteristics not fixed by the
economic fundamentals, the sunspot extension, appropriately. The sunspot
extension consist of the probabilities of the sunspot states pi, the asset struc-
ture A and also the risk aversion functions hi. The sunspot equilibria are
robust with respect to perturbations of these characteristics however sunspot
equilibria will not exist for all possible choices of the sunspot extension.
This finishes the description of the model.
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3 Sunspot Equilibria and the Transfer Para-
dox
In the sunspot literature agents transfer commodity bundles across sunspot
states by trading assets. In the international trade literature one thinks of
transfers of commodities arising from donations. Each sunspot state will
later on be associated with different such donations. The transfer paradox is
said to occur if some agent donates some of his resources to some other agent
and the recipients utility decreases. In the case of two agents by Pareto-
efficiency within spot markets the donor’s utility increases. In this statement
the utility comparison is done across the competitive equilibria of the econ-
omy before and after the donation. In the standard case of the transfer para-
dox, the transfer was considered to be a transfer of a non-negative amount
of commodities (Leontief (1936)). In order to make the equivalence to the
sunspot model more obvious we consider a slightly more general definition
of the transfer paradox which only requires that the donated commodities
have non-negative value in the competitive equilibrium after the transfer.
As Geanakoplos and Heal (1983) have already shown this generalization is
innocuous.
In the following definition we consider alternative possible transfers∆ω(z)
that we index by some scenarios z. When relating the transfer paradox to
sunspot equilibria these scenarios will be associated with different states of
the world, s = 1, ..., S. Taking care of potentially multiple equilibria the
transfer paradox is then defined as in1
Def inition 2 (Transfer Paradox) Given an economy with fundamentals
[(ui,ωi)i=1,...,I ] the transfer paradox occurs if and only if there exists some
transfer of endowments ∆ω(z) ∈ IRLI , with ∑Ii=1∆ωi(z) = 0 such that for
the economy [(ui,ωi +∆ωi(z))i=1,...,I ] there exists an equilibrium (
∗
x(z),
∗
p(z))
with
∗
p(z) · ∆ω1(z) ≥ 0 so that u1(∗x1(z)) < u1(∗x1(0)) for some equilibrium
(
∗
x(0),
∗
p(0)) of the economic fundamentals,[(ui,ωi)i=1,...,I ], in the reference sce-
nario without transfers s = 0.
Note that under certain conditions and if the economic fundamentals have
at least two equilibria then even without any transfers the transfer paradox
occurs. Our definition covers this case because then ∆ω = 0 is already
sufficient to obtain u1(
∗
x
1
(z)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(0)) for the two equilibria s = 0, z. Of
1To save on notation we define the transfer paradox with respect to the value of the
transfers and changes in utility of agent 1.
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course if the resulting equilibria are regular then in this case one can also find
some transfers of endowments that have positive value and yet the recipients
utility decreases. Making the transfer paradox a bit more paradoxical.
We will show that the occurrence of the transfer paradox is a necessary
condition for sunspots to matter. To show a converse of this claim we consider
the following slightly stronger notion of the transfer paradox.
Def inition 3 (Strong Transfer Paradox) Given an economy with fun-
damentals [(ui,ωi)i=1,...,I ] the strong transfer paradox occurs if and only if
there exist some transfers of endowments, ∆ω(z) ∈ IRLI , with∑Ii=1∆ωi(z) =
0 and ∆ω(s˜) ∈ IRLI , with ∑Ii=1∆ωi(s˜) = 0 such that for the economies
[(ui,ωi +∆ωi(s))i=1,...,I ], s = z, s˜
1. there are some equilibria (
∗
x(z),
∗
p(z)),(
∗
x(s˜),
∗
p(s˜)) with
∗
p(z) ·∆ω1(z) ≥ 0
and
∗
p(s˜) ·∆ω1(s˜) ≤ 0 and
2. it holds that u1(
∗
x
1
(z)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(s˜)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(0)) for some equilibrium
(
∗
x(0),
∗
p(0)) of the economic fundamentals [(ui,ωi)i=1,...,I ], in the refer-
ence scenario without transfers s = 0.
Note, that if the economic fundamentals have at least three equilibria then
by the same reason as given for the transfer paradox the strong transfer para-
dox occurs. Hence the existence of at least (three) two equilibria is sufficient
for the (strong) transfer paradox. Of course, in regular economies we know
that if there are at least two equilibria then there also are at least three
equilibria (cf. Dierker (1972)). This observation indicates that in regular
economies the transfer paradox and the strong transfer paradox are actually
equivalent. Indeed this it true as the next proposition shows. Recall that in
regular economies equilibria are well determined, i.e. in a neighborhood of
regular equilibria (being defined by full rank of the Jacobian of market excess
demand) there exists a smooth mapping from the exogenous parameters of
the economy to the endogenous equilibrium values (cf. Debreu (1970)). In
the following argument regularity needs only be required for the spot market
equilibria of the economic fundamentals. This property holds generically in
the set of agents‘ initial endowments IRLI++ (cf. Debreu (1970)).
Proposition 1 Suppose all spot market equilibria of the economic funda-
mentals [(ui,ωi)i=1,...,I ] are regular. Then the transfer paradox and the strong
transfer paradox are equivalent.
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Proof
The strong transfer paradox implies the transfer paradox. To establish
the converse suppose that the transfer paradox holds. I.e. there exists some
transfer of endowments ∆ω(z) ∈ IRLI , with ∑Ii=1∆ωi(z) = 0, such that for
the economy [(ui,ωi +∆ωi(z))i=1,...,i] there exists an equilibrium (
∗
x(z),
∗
p(z))
with
∗
p(z) · ∆ω1(z) ≥ 0 so that u1(∗x1(z)) < u1(∗x1(0)) for some equilibrium
(
∗
x
i
(0),
∗
p(0)) of the economic fundamentals, s = 0.
We need to show that there also exists some∆ω(s˜) ∈ IRLI , with∑Ii=1∆ωi(s˜) =
0 such that
∗
p(s˜) ·∆ω1(s˜) ≤ 0 and u1(∗x1(z)) < u1(∗x1(s˜)) < u1(∗x1(0)).
This is of course the intuitive case in which a negatively valued transfer
leads to a loss in utility. However, we need to ensure that this is the outcome
in the spot market equilibrium after the transfer and that the utility loss is
not too severe as compared to the loss in the transfer paradox case. This is
ensured by the regularity of the equilibrium of the economic fundamentals
from which we construct the transfer appropriately:
Consider the utility gradient of agent 1, ∇u1(∗x1(0)) at the equilibrium
of the economic fundamentals. Choose the transfers, (∆ω1(s˜)) such that
∇u1(∗x1(0))(∆ω1(s˜)) < 0. By the first order condition of utility maximization
in the reference situation s = 0 we get that this wealth transfer evaluated at
the pre-transfer prices is negative,
∗
p(0)·(∆ω(s˜)) < 0. Since∇u1(∗x1(0))(∆ω(s˜)) <
0, by Proposition 31.2 (ii) in Magill and Quinzii (1996) we can find some
1 ≥ α > 0 such that u1(∗x1(0) + α(∆ω(s˜))) < u1(∗x1(0)). Moreover, by the
regularity of the economy, α > 0 can be chosen small enough so that also
the utility at the induced equilibrium is smaller than in the reference sit-
uation without transfers, u1(
∗
x
1
(s˜)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(0)). This is because in regular
economies the induced change in the equilibrium allocation
∗
x
1
(s˜) can be held
small so that | u1(∗x1(s˜)) − u1(∗x1(0) + α∆ω(s˜)) | is also small. Moreover, by
the same continuity argument this can be done such that ∆ω1(s˜) evaluated
at prices after the transfer is non-positive, i.e.
∗
p(s˜) ·∆ω1(s˜) ≤ 0. Finally, all
this can be done without decreasing the utility level too much, so that for
agent 1 we get the inequality u1(
∗
x
1
(z)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(s˜)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(0)). "
The strong transfer paradox ensures the order crossing property men-
tioned in the introduction. To see this note that it is always possible to
find transfers of resources, say ∆ω(sˆ), such that the transfer to agent 1
has negative value in the resulting equilibrium, i.e.
∗
p(sˆ) · ∆ω1(sˆ) ≤ 0,
and agent 1 gets a level of utility that is smaller than any of the util-
ity levels considered in the definition of the strong transfer paradox, i.e.
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u1(
∗
x
1
(sˆ)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(z)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(s˜)) < u1(
∗
x
1
(0)).2 By this observation we get
three transfers, two with negative value and one with positive value so that
the utility decreases for all transfers. As we will see, by Assumption 1, in
the case of two agents, we then get that the order of the marginal utilities
does not coincide with the order or the reverse order of the transfer values,
i.e. the order crossing property is also obtained for marginal utilities.
Note that the transfer paradox concerns the ordering of income trans-
fers and utility levels. In the first order condition for asset demand however
marginal utilities and not utility levels themselves play a role. Hence we need
to know how the levels of marginal utility are related to the utility levels.
Keeping prices fixed across different states, by concavity of the utility func-
tion, marginal utilities are inversely related to utility levels. This feature
occurs for example if the agents have identical and homothetic preferences.
In this case however neither sunspot equilibria matter nor the transfer para-
dox occurs. In general, changes in relative prices induced by redistributions
of income are decisive to determine both the level of utility and of marginal
utility. It is these changes from which the transfer paradox and also the ex-
istence of sunspot equilibria are derived. Nevertheless, with only two agents
we show that marginal utilities are negatively associated to the level of util-
ities. To make these ideas precise, we first define the agents’ indirect utility
function and their marginal utility of income within each state:
Let
vi(s) = vi(p(s), bi(s)) = max
xi∈Xi
L∑
l=1
gil(x
i
l(s)) s.t. p(s) · xi(s) ≤ bi(s)
be the indirect utility of agents i in state s. Since the functions gil , l = 1, . . . , L
are concave and since at least L − 1 of them are strictly concave there is a
unique point xi at which the indirect utility attains its maximum, given that
for all commodities the prices pl(s), l = 1, . . . , L and the income bi(s) are
positive. In our model the income bi(s) will be given by p(s) · (ωi +A(s) · θi).
I.e. the values of the transfers are given by ri(s) = p(s) · A(s) · θi. In the
analysis of the sunspot model the agents‘ marginal utility of income will be
important
λi(s) = ∂vh
i(vi(s))∂bv
i(p(s), bi(s)).
2Note that these losses in utility as compared to the equilibrium of the economic fun-
damentals do not conflict with the fact that trade is voluntary because it may well be
that the utility of agent 1 derived from his initial endowments is even smaller than the
expected utility obtained in the spot market equilibria. Also the agent is assumed to be a
price taker, i.e. he cannot enforce the equilibrium of the economic fundamentals.
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Hence the marginal utilities that matter determine the asset allocation are
given by the marginal utilities within each state,∂bvi(p(s), bi(s)), multiplied
by the first derivative of the agents‘ concave transformations hi determining
the agents‘ risk aversion.
The association between levels of utilities and of marginal utilities is an
important link between the transfer paradox and sunspot equilibria which
we therefore need to define properly:
Def inition 4 (Inverse Association of Utilities and Marginal Utilities)
We say that for some agent i the levels of marginal utility are inversely as-
sociated to the levels of utility if
vi(1) ≥ vi(2) ≥ . . . ≥ vi(S)
and that
λi(1) ≤ λi(2) ≤ . . . ≤ λi(S).
Moreover, if vi(s˜) < vi(z) for some s˜, z ∈ {1, . . . , S} then the correspond-
ing inequality in the marginal utilities of income is also strict.
This definition puts us now in the position to state the equivalence of the
occurrence of the transfer paradox and the existence of sunspot equilibria.
Theorem 1 (Equivalence between Sunspot Equilibria and the Transfer Paradox)
Suppose all agents’ level of marginal utility are inversely associated to their
level of utility. Then
1. the transfer paradox is a necessary condition for sunspots to matter and
2. if there are only two agents then the strong transfer paradox is a suffi-
cient condition for sunspots to matter.
Proof
1. To link the transfer paradox to the sunspot economy consider
ri(s) :=
∗
p(s) · A(s)
∗
θi,
i.e. the transfer of income to agent i as generated by asset trade in
some competitive equilibrium.
A necessary condition for optimal portfolio choice is
S∑
s=1
λi(s)pi(s)ri(s) = 0, i = 1, ..., I,
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which we call the first-order conditions for asset demand.3
Now suppose that the transfer paradox does not hold. Then negative
transfers ris < 0 are associated with lower utility levels than positive
transfers ris > 0. If moreover marginal utilities are inversely related
to utilities then negative transfers are associated with higher marginal
utility levels than positive transfers are. Hence the first order condition
for asset demand requires that the probability weighted sum of the
absolute values of negative transfers in smaller than the probability
weigthed sum of positive transfers:∑
s:ris>0
pisr
i
s > −
∑
s:ris<0
pisr
i
s (1)
This however conflicts with asset market clearing, which implies that
income transfers must be balanced:
I∑
i=1
ris = 0, for all s = 1, ..., S. (2)
To see this, multiply equation (2) by pis and sum those equations over
states to obtain:
S∑
s=1
I∑
i=1
ris = 0. (3)
Rearranging terms this implies
I∑
i=1
∑
s:ris>0
pisr
i
s −
∑
s:ris<0
pisr
i
s
 = 0, (4)
which contradicts (1).
2. Suppose the strong transfer paradox occurs, then there exist transfers
indexed by s˜, z such that
r(z) ≥ 0, r(s˜) ≤ 0 and for some equilibria v1(z) < v1(s˜) < v1(0)
3This condition follows from
∑
s λ
i(s)pi(s)p(s)A(s) = γiq together with q ·θi = 0, i=1,2.
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where v1(0) refers to agent 1’s utility in an equilibrium of the spot
economy s = 0.
Given the utility functions u1, u2 and given the total endowments ω1 +
ω2 consider the set of Pareto-efficient allocations as being parameterized
by the income transfers r.
Now we have to distinguish three cases:
Case 1: If r(z) > 0
then we know that b1(z) > 0 and therefore there exists r(sˆ) < 0 suffi-
ciently small such that for the induced b1(sˆ) = (b1(z) + r(sˆ)) ≥ 0 we
get v1(sˆ) < v1(z) for some equilibrium in sˆ. By this observation and
the strong transfer paradox we have the order crossing property:
r(sˆ) ≤ 0, r(s˜) ≤ 0, r(z) > 0
while
v1(sˆ) < v1(z) < v1(s˜)
so that by the negative association of marginal utilities to the level of
utilities
λ1(sˆ) > λ1(z) > λ1(s˜)
To construct the sunspot equilibrium consider an economy with the
three states s = sˆ, s˜, z. In this case the first-order conditions for asset
demand become:
λi(sˆ)pi(sˆ)|r(sˆ)| + λi(s˜)pi(s˜)|r(s˜)| = λi(z)pi(z)|r(z)|, i = 1, 2.
Now choose pi(z) < 1 sufficiently large (and accordingly pi(sˆ) > 0 and
pi(s˜) > 0 sufficiently small) such that
pi(sˆ)|r(sˆ)| + pi(s˜)|r(s˜)| < pi(z)|r(z)|.
Note that ∂hi is any continuous, positive and decreasing function. Re-
call that, λ1(s˜) < λ1(z) and that v1(sˆ) is the smallest utility level in
the three states. Hence we can choose h1 such that λ1(sˆ) is sufficiently
large to solve the first order condition for i = 1. Analogously it follows
that λ2(sˆ) < λ2(z) and we can choose h2 such that λ2(s˜) is sufficiently
large to solve the first order condition for i = 2.
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To complete the proof we follow the analogous steps as in Mas-Colell
(1992). Choose A ∈ IR3L×2 such that
r(s) = p(s) · (A1(s)− A2(s)) for s = s˜, sˆ, z. (5)
Finally, note that∑
s
λ1(s)pi(s)p(s) · A1(s) =
∑
s
λ1(s)pi(s)p(s) · A2(s)
so that we can choose q1 = q2. Accordingly we choose θ1 = (1,−1), θ2 =
(−1, 1) so that q · θi = 0, i = 1, 2 and θ1 + θ2 = 0. Since we have chosen
an economy with two assets, the first-order conditions for asset trade
are equivalent to the conditions
∑
s λ
i(s)pi(s)p(s)A(s) = γiq.
Case 2: If r(z) = 0 and r(s˜) = 0
then by the strong transfer paradox, even without trading any asset,
there is a competitive equilibrium in which sunspots matter.
Case 3: Finally, the case r(z) = 0 and r(s˜) < 0
is already covered by the reasoning of the first case if one changes the
point of view from agent 1 to agent 2.
"
Remark 2 Note that in the theorem above Part 1 has been shown for the
most general statement without evoking any particular assumption on the
asset structure A ∈ IRSL×J . Part 2 however is a stronger claim the more the
set of asset structures can be restricted. The choice of the asset structure
matters in equation (5) of the proof. One way of restricting A is to only
consider numeraire assets so that all assets pay off in the same commodity.
Allowing for sunspot dependent assets this is a possible choice in the solution
of equation (5). If assets are not allowed to depend on the sunspot states
then one can still find an asset structure solving equation (5), provided the
three price vectors p(s), s = s˜, sˆ, z are linearly independent. The latter then
requires to have at least 3 commodities.
To complete this section we first show that under Assumption 1 in the
case of two agents the order of the marginal utilities of income is inverse to
the order of their (indirect) utilities. Hence not only in the trivial case of
identical and homothetic preferences we get this property but we also get it
for all numerical examples with two agents that have so far been considered
in the sunspot and in the transfer paradox literature.
14
Lemma 1 Suppose there are only two agents. Without loss of generality
assume that in a competitive equilibrium
v1(1) ≤ v1(2) ≤ . . . ≤ v1(S).
Then under Assumption 1 it follows that
λ1(1) ≥ λ1(2) ≥ . . . ≥ λ1(S)
and that
λ2(1) ≤ λ2(2) ≤ . . . ≤ λ2(S).
Moreover, if v1(s˜) < v1(z) for some s˜, z ∈ {1, . . . , S} then the correspond-
ing inequality in the marginal utilities of income is also strict.
Proof
Assume that
v1(s˜) ≤ v1(z) (resp. that v1(s˜) < v1(z)) for some s˜, z ∈ {1, . . . , S}.
Then, by monotonicity of the utility function, for some commodity, say k ∈
{l, . . . , L} we must have that
x1k(s˜) ≤ x1k(z) (resp. that x1k(s˜) < x1k(z)).
Moreover, Pareto-efficiency within spot markets implies that for all states
s = 1, . . . , S the marginal rates of substitution are equal across agents, i.e.
∂g1m(x
1
m(s))
∂g1l (x
1
l (s))
=
∂g2m(x
2
m(s))
∂g2l (x
2
l (s))
for any pair of commodities (l,m). Note that x2m(s) = ω
1
m + ω
2
m − x1m(s),
s = 1, . . . , S. Hence if the functions gil are concave and if for some agent the
function gil is strictly concave then it follows that
x1l (s˜) ≤ x1l (z) (resp. that x1l (s˜) < x1l (z)) for all l = 1, . . . , L.
Without loss of generality assume that l = n is the numeraire in all states
s = 1, . . . , S, where n is chosen such that g1n is strictly concave. Hence we
have shown that
v1(1) ≤ v1(2) ≤ . . . ≤ v1(S) (with v1(s˜) < v1(z) for some s˜, z)
implies for the numeraire that
x1n(1) ≤ x1n(2) ≤ . . . ≤ x1n(S) (with x1n(s˜) < x1n(z)) for some s˜, z.
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From the first oder condition to the maximization problem
max
xi∈Xi
u1(x1(s)) s.t. p(s) · x1(s) ≤ b1(s)
we get that ∂bv1(p(s), b1(s)) = ∂g1n(x
1
n(s)) for all s = 1, . . . , S. Since h
1 and
g1n are strictly concave and since x
1
1(s) and v
1(s) are increasing (resp. strictly
increasing) in s we get that
λ1(1) ≥ λ1(2) ≥ . . . ≥ λ1(S) (resp. that λ1(z) > λ1(s˜)).
The claim for i = 2 follows analogously from the inverse inequalities
x21(1) ≥ x21(2) ≥ . . . ≥ x21(S)
and from
v2(1) ≥ v2(2) ≥ . . . ≥ v2(S),
the latter inequalities being implied by Pareto-efficiency within spot markets.
"
Before passing to the next section we want to point out that for establish-
ing the inverse association between the levels of marginal utilities and that
of utilities, as done in Lemma 1, the assumption of additive separability is
tight. I.e. as the following example shows without additive separability one
can find that lower utilities are associated with lower marginal utilities.
Remark 3 Consider an two-agent economy with two commodities. The util-
ity functions are:
u1(x1) =
√
x11x
1
2 + x
1
2 and u
2(x2) =
√
x21x
2
2 + x
2
1.
Note that neither of the two utility functions is additively separable but both
are strictly monotonically increasing and strictly concave on IR2++ and both
satisfy the Inada-conditions. Moreover, note that both utility functions are
homogenous of degree one implying that both goods are normal. In situation
s = 1 the endowments are
ω11(1) = 1, ω
1
2(1) = 5 and ω
2
1(1) = 4, ω
2
2(1) = 2
There is a unique equilibrium4 with prices p(1) = (1, 0.7125). The equilibrium
budgets are:
b1(1) = 4.5623 and b2(1) = 5.4249.
4All values have been rounded to 4 decimal digits. The exact values can be found at
the page http://www.iew.unizh.ch/home/hens. Uniqueness can be seen from the graph of
the excess demand also shown on the webpage.
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The resulting allocation is:
x11(1) = 0.5380, x
1
2(1) = 5.6485 and x
2
1(1) = 4.4620, x
2
2(1) = 1.3515.
The utility levels are:
u1(1) = 7.3917 and u2(1) = 6.9177.
Marginal utilities within state 1 are
(
∂bvi(1) =
vi(1)
bi(1)
)
i=1,2.
are:
∂bv
1(1) = 1.6202 and ∂bv
2(1) = 1.2752.
Now consider a second situation s = 2 with the same total endowments
but with a distribution of endowments as:
ω11(2) = 5, ω
1
2(2) = 5 and ω
2
1(2) = 0, ω
2
2(2) = 2.
Again, there is a unique equilibrium, now with prices p(2) = (1, 1.5113). The
equilibrium budgets are:
b1(2) = 12.5563 and b2(2) = 3.0225.
The resulting allocation is:
x11(2) = 2.3164, x
1
2(2) = 6.7758 and x
2
1(2) = 2.6836, x
2
2(2) = 0.2242.
The utility levels are:
u1(2) = 10.7375 and u2(2) = 3.4594.
Marginal utilities within state 2 are:
∂bv
1(2) = 0.8552 and ∂bv
2(2) = 1.1445.
Note that the second agent‘s utility and his marginal utility has decreased
is passing from situation 1 to situation 2. Finally, note that we can find two
strictly concave functions hi such that the same ordering still holds for the
marginal utilities λi(s) = ∂vhi(vi)∂bvi(s).
The next example shows that for more than two agents the strong transfer
paradox is no longer sufficient for the existence of sunspot equilibria. The
simple reason is that for agent 1 the strong transfer paradox may occur while
the two other agents will not find income transfers of opposite sign.
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Remark 4 The example to construct the strong transfer paradox is the fa-
mous three country example from Chichilinski (1980).
There are three agents and two good. The utility functions are:
u1(x11, x
1
2) = min(x
1
1, 4x
1
2) , u
2(x21, x
2
2) = min(x
2
1, x
2
2) , u
3(x31, x
3
2) = min(2.8 x
3
1, x
3
2).
Note that this example uses Leontief preferences. Hence strictly spoken our
Assumption 1 is not satisfied. However, these preferences can be attained as a
limit case of CES-utility functions. That is to say, perturbing the preferences
slightly within the CES-class will establish an example satisfying assumption
1. Moreover, note that both utility functions are homogenous of degree one
implying that both goods are normal. Consider the situations s = 0, s˜, z, sˆ as
required by the strong transfer paradox.
Let the matrix of endowments (for both goods per agent and state), with
rows corresponding to states s = 0, sˆ, z, s˜ and with columns corresponding to
agents, be:
ω =

(1, 1) (2, 1) (1, 3)
(1, 0.1) (2, 2.4) (1, 2.5)
(1, 1.1) (2, 1) (1, 2.9)
(1, 0.8) (2, 1.25) (1, 2.95)
 ,
In all situations there is a unique equilibrium5. The equilibrium price
vectors are:
p(0) = (5.90842, 1)
p(s˜) = (4.4892, 1)
p(z) = (9.6382, 1)
p(sˆ) = (0.9438, 1).
Evaluated at these equilibrium prices the transfers as compared to situa-
tion s = 0 are:
r1(s˜) = −0.2, r2(s˜) = 0.25 and r3(s˜) = −0.5
r1(z) = 0.1, r2(z) = 0 and r3(z) = −0.1
r1(sˆ) = −0.9, r2(sˆ) = 1.4 and r3(sˆ) = −0.5.
5All values have been rounded to 4 decimal digits. The exact values can be found at the
page http://www.iew.unizh.ch/home/hens. Uniqueness can be seen from the graph of the
excess demand function which is displayed at the webpage together with the computations.
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The equilibrium budgets are:
b1(0) = 6.9084, b2(0) = 12.8169 and b3(0) = 8.9084
b1(s˜) = 5.2892, b2(s˜) = 10.2284 and b3(s˜) = 7.4392
b1(z) = 10.7382, b2(z) = 20.2765 and b3(z) = 12.5382
b1(sˆ) = 1.0438, b2(sˆ) = 4.2876 and b3(sˆ) = 3.4438.
The resulting allocations are:
x =

(1.1218, 0.2804) (1.8552, 1.8552) (1.0230, 2.8643)
(1.1161, 0.2790) (1.8634, 1.8634) (1.0206, 2.8576)
(1.0860, 0.2715) (1.9060, 1.9060) (1.0080, 2.8225)
(0.8744, 0.2186) (2.2058, 2.2058) (0.9120, 2.5756)
 ,
The corresponding utility levels are:
u1(0) = 1.1218, u2(0) = 1.8552 and u3(0) = 2.8643
u1(s˜) = 1.1161, u2(s˜) = 1.8634 and u3(s˜) = 2.8576
u1(z) = 1.0860, u2(z) = 1.9060 and u3(z) = 2.8225
u1(sˆ) = 0.8744, u2(sˆ) = 2.2058 and u3(sˆ) = 2.5756.
Marginal utilities
(
∂bvi(s) =
vi(s)
bi(s)
)
i=1,2,3.
are:
λ1(0) = 0.1624, λ2(0) = 0.1448 and λ3(0) = 0.3215
λ1(s˜) = 0.2110, λ2(s˜) = 0.1822 and λ3(s˜) = 0.3841
λ1(z) = 0.1011, λ2(z) = 0.0940 and λ3(z) = 0.2251
λ1(sˆ) = 0.8377, λ2(sˆ) = 0.5145 and λ3(sˆ) = 0.7479.
Note that the second agent‘s transfers are never negative while that of
the third agent are never positive. Hence these transfers cannot be sustained
by asset trade. Finally, note that as compared to situation s = 0 the third
agent‘s utility and his marginal utility has decreased in passing to situation
s = z.
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4 Sunspot Equilibria and Uniqueness of Spot
Market Equilibria
Having established the link between the transfer paradox and the existence of
sunspot equilibria we now derive some new results on the existence of sunspot
equilibria when spot market equilibria are unique on the one hand and also
on the possibility of the transfer paradox on the other hand. Applying Part
1 of our theorem and Trannoy (1986) we can rule out sunspot equilibria if
marginal utilities are inversely related to utilities and spot market equilib-
ria are unique at all non-negative distributions of endowments. Once again,
applying Part 1 of our theorem and Balasko (1978) we can rule out sunspot
equilibria in the case of two commodities and two agents if the economic fun-
damentals do have a unique equilibrium. We continue, using Part 2 of our
theorem, to show that sunspot equilibria need not be derived from multiple
equilibria of the spot market economy that is obtained by asset trade leading
to the same endowment distribution in all states. While Mas-Colell (1992)‘s
construction uses that there are multiple equilibria for the induced distribu-
tion of endowments, this example however exploits the fact that there are
multiple equilibria for the initial distribution of endowments.
The following terminology is quite useful. A randomization equilibrium is
a competitive equilibrium in which for some ex-post endowments the equi-
librium allocation in every state s is a spot market allocation for the same
economy. If, for example, the economic fundamentals allow for multiple equi-
libria then there is a randomization equilibrium. Mas-Colell (1992) has shown
that there can also be randomization equilibria if there are multiple equilib-
ria for some distribution of endowments that is attainable via asset trade.
In both cases the equilibrium allocation of such a competitive equilibrium
is a randomization among the set of equilibria of some underlying economy.
In randomization equilibria sunspots are a device to coordinate agents‘ ex-
pectations. This case of sunspot equilibria has found many applications. In
the international trade literature, for example, currency crises are modelled
by randomization sunspot equilibria. See, for example, the seminal papers
by Obstfeld (1994) and Obstfeld (1996) and also the interesting empirical
papers on this issue by Jeanne (1997) and Jeanne (2000)).
The question that arises from these observations is whether sunspot equi-
libria could be identified with randomization equilibria. This would then
make them very similar to publicly correlated equilibria known in the game
theoretic literature (Aumann (1974))6. Hence, the results of this literature
6See Forges and Peck (1995) for relating sunspot equilibria to correlated equilibria in
an overlapping generations model.
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would then be applicable to sunspot equilibria.
It is obvious that in our setting with intrinsically complete markets sunspot
equilibria necessarily are randomization equilibria if assets are sun-independent
assets, if A(s) = A(1), s = 1, . . . , S. It is, however, not obvious at all whether
with a general asset structure there can also be sunspot equilibria which are
different from randomization equilibria. To clarify this point some more def-
initions are needed.
Def inition 5 (Attainable Endowment Distributions) Given the econo-
mic fundamentals [(ui,ωi)i=1,...,I ] and given the asset structure A the endow-
ment distributions ωˆi(s), s = 1, . . . , S, i = 1, ..., I is attainable if there exists
some competitive equilibrium with asset allocation (
∗
θ
i
),i=1,...,I, such that
ωˆi(s) = ωi + A(s)
∗
θ
i
, s = 1, . . . , S, i = 1, ..., I.
Based on the attainability concept we now define the uniqueness concept
suggested in Mas-Colell (1992). This condition has later been called no
potential multiplicity by Gottardi and Kajii (1999).
Def inition 6 (Strong Uniqueness) The economy with the fundamentals
[(ui,ωi)i=1,...,I ] satisfies the strong uniqueness property for some asset struc-
ture A, if the spot market equilibria are unique for every attainable endow-
ment distribution.
Remark 5 With intrinsically incomplete markets sunspots are known to
matter even if the economic fundamentals satisfy the strong uniqueness prop-
erty (cf. Cass (1989) and the literature that has emerged from it, Guesnerie
and Laffont (1988) and Gottardi and Kajii (1999)).
As said above, when assets are sun-independent then in our setting with
intrinsically complete markets the strong uniqueness property rules out sunspot
equilibria. The following corollary to our theorem shows that for general asset
structures the strong uniqueness property restricted to non-negative alloca-
tions is still sufficient to rule out sunspot equilibria when marginal utilities
are inversely related to levels of utility.
Corollary 1 Under assumptions 1 and 2 and if marginal utilities are in-
versely related to levels of utility then sunspots do not matter if there are
unique spot market equilibria for all non-negative distributions of endow-
ments in the Edgeworth box.
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Proof
Suppose sunspots did matter, then from our main result we know that the
transfer paradox needs to occur. However, as Trannoy (1986) has shown, this
requires to be able to trade to some non-negative distribution of endowments
for which there are multiple equilibria, which is a violation of the strong
uniqueness property. "
Hence applying our Lemma 1, in particular in the case of two agents,
sunspots do not matter if there are unique spot market equilibria for all
distributions of endowments in the Edgeworth box.
However, asking for the strong uniqueness property may be asking too
much since not many economic fundamentals will satisfy this property. Hence
the question arises whether sunspot equilibria can exist when there are multi-
ple equilibria for some distribution of endowments the economy can arrive at
using asset trade. As Mas-Colell (1992) has shown this is definitely the case.
However, Mas-Colell (1992) did not show that this is still the case if for the
initial distribution of endowments there is a unique equilibrium. Note if there
were also multiple equilibria at that point then sunspots would matter even
without evoking asset trade. The question then is whether ”trading from
uniqueness to multiplicity” is possible. As the following corollary shows, this
is not possible if there are two agents and two commodities.
Corollary 2 Under assumptions 1 and 2, in the case of two commodities
and two consumers sunspots do not matter if the economic fundamentals
have a unique equilibrium.
Proof
Suppose sunspots did matter then from our main result we know that the
transfer paradox needs to occur. However, as for example Balasko (1978)7
has shown, in the case of two commodities this requires to have multiple
equilibria for the initial distributions of endowments. "
From Corollary 2 we can see that in the case of two commodities and
sun-independent assets it is not possible to ”trade from uniqueness to mul-
tiplicity”. This is because with sun-independent assets sunspots can only
matter at distributions of endowments for which there are multiple equilib-
ria.
Hens (2000) has claimed that for an economy with two agents and two
commodities in which utility functions are concave transformations of Cobb-
Douglas utility functions sunspots matter. The Corollaries 1 and 2 both show
that this claim is incorrect. Moreover the mistake in Hens (2000) cannot be
7See also the solution to exercise 15.B.10C from Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995)
that is given in Hara, Segal and Tadelis (1997).
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cured by changing the values of the parameters for the same example8 because
that example falls into the broad class of economies which are covered by
this note. Indeed for Cobb-Douglas economies the equilibrium at the initial
distribution of endowments is unique and the strong uniqueness requirement
is satisfied for almost all asset structures A.
Making further assumptions on the agents‘ risk aversion functions hi,
Pilgrim (2000) shows that the construction of Mas-Colell (1992) does not
work if there are only two commodities. Indeed, Pilgrim (2000) shows for
an economy with an arbitrary number of consumers with additive separable
utilities ui and non-decreasing relative risk aversion, with two commodities
and with asset payoffs that are independent of the sunspot states, non-trivial
sunspot equilibria do not exist.
The next corollary shows that as in the case of intrinsically incomplete
markets also with intrinsically complete markets sunspots can still matter
even if they do not serve as a coordination device among multiple equilibria.
Corollary 3 With sun-dependent assets, under assumptions 1 and 2, even
for the case of two commodities, there are sunspot equilibria which are not
randomization equilibria.
Proof
The example we give to prove this corollary is adapted from the Example
15.B.2 in Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995)9. There are two com-
modities and two agents with endowments [(ω11,ω
1
2), (ω
2
1,ω
2
2)] = [(2, r), (r, 2)].
Consumption sets are X i = {x ∈ IRL++|ui(x) ≥ ui(ωi)} and utility functions
are given by
u1(x1) = x11 −
1
8
(x12)
−8 and u2(x2) = −1
8
(x21)
−8 + x22.
Aggregate endowments are ω = (2 + r, 2 + r) where r = 2
8
9 − 2 19 ≈ 0.77.
Figure 1 shows the Edgeworth Box of this economy.10
The convex curve is the set of Pareto-efficient allocations that lie in the
interior of the Edgeworth Box. It is given by the function x12 =
1
2+r−x11 . The
competitive equilibrium allocations of our example will be constructed out of
these interior allocations. In Figure 1 we have also drawn some budget lines
8This possibility is left open by the observation of Barnett and Fisher (2002) who
demonstrate that for the specific parameter values chosen in Hens (2000) sunspots do not
matter!
9See Hara, Segal and Tadelis (1997) for the solution to the original example.
10The Figures 1 and 2 have been generated with MATLAB!. The scripts can be
downloaded from the page http://www.iew.unizh.ch/home/hens.
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Figure 1: Edgeworth-Box
indexed by s = sˆ, z, s˜, 0, supporting four different Pareto-efficient allocations
which are equilibrium allocations in the spot markets once appropriate spot
market endowments have been chosen. The sunspot equilibrium we con-
struct exploits the fact that in this example there are three equilibria for the
distribution of endowments [(ω11,ω
1
2), (ω
2
1,ω
2
2)] = [(2, r), (r, 2)]. Taking these
endowments as the reference point for the economy s = 0, we consider the
transfer of endowments as visualized in Figure 2. From the three equilibria
at [(2, r), (r, 2)] we have chosen the one with the highest first agent utility to
be the equilibrium allocation for the reference situation s = 0.
The asset structure A consists of numeraire assets denominated in the
second commodity. The vertical line in figure 2 indicates the possible direc-
tion of endowment redistributions. With reference to s = 0, in the situation
z the first agent has received a transfer of the second commodity but his util-
ity decreases. In the situations sˆ, s˜ the first agent has donated some of the
second commodity and with reference to s = 0 his utility decreases. While
in sˆ it falls to the lowest of the four values, in s˜ it obtains a value between
the utility in s = 0 and s = z. Hence for these transfers the strong transfer
paradox occurs and by application of our main result there exists a sunspot
equilibrium with spot market endowments given by the intersection of the
budget lines sˆ, z,and s˜ with the vertical line through the point (2, 0), while
the selected equilibrium in reference economy has the budget line 0.
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Figure 2: Zoom of the rectangle in Figure 1
Although this sunspot equilibrium lies in a neighborhood of a randomiza-
tion equilibrium it is itself not a randomization equilibrium because all spot
market endowments differ. "
This example exploits the multiplicity of equilibria of the economic funda-
mentals in the sense that in the neighborhood of the endowment distribution
leading to multiple equilibria the budget lines have various slopes that are
not ordered as the utility levels resulting in the ex post spot market equilibria
(see Figures 1 and 2). This property could however also occur with a unique
equilibrium for the economic fundamentals. Imagine for example that the
area in the rectangle of Figure 1 would lie outside the Edgeworth-Box. Then
keeping the line along which the transfers are defined inside the Edgeworth-
Box the same construction could be done. Unfortunately, we could however
give no simple utility functions as in Example 15.B.2 in Mas-Colell, Whinston
and Green (1995) which would lead to this feature.
5 Conclusion
Throughout the paper we restricted attention to economies with additively
separable utility functions since those functions are commonly used when
applying general equilibrium models. We showed that for the case of two
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agents (countries) the existence of sunspot equilibria is equivalent to the
occurrence of the transfer paradox. This equivalence enabled us to show
that sunspots cannot matter if the economy has a unique equilibrium for all
distributions of endowments induced by asset trade or if the initial economy
has a unique spot market equilibrium and there are only two commodities.
Moreover, we gave two examples showing that sunspot equilibria need not
result from multiplicity of spot market equilibria.
We hope that this paper has clarified the relation between the existence of
sunspot equilibria and the uniqueness of spot market equilibria for economies
with intrinsically complete asset markets. Moreover, further exploring the
connection between sunspot equilibria and the transfer paradox, future re-
search might also show interesting new results in related settings. For exam-
ple one could try to get new insights for the sunspot literature by exploring
the results on the transfer paradox in the overlapping generations model (Ga-
lor and Polemarchakis (1987)). And similarly there might be new results in
storage analyzing economies with transaction costs respectively tariffs (Lahiri
and Raimondos (1995)).
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